Abstract. Preventing fake or duplicate e-identities (aka sybils) from joining an e-community may be crucial to its survival, especially if it utilizes a consensus protocol among its members or employs democratic governance, where sybils can undermine consensus, tilt decisions, or even take over. Here, we explore the use of a trust graph of identities, with trust edges representing trust among identity owners, to allow a community to grow without increasing its sybil penetration. Since identities are admitted to the e-community based on their trust by existing e-community members, corrupt identities, which may trust sybils, also pose a threat to the e-community. Sybils and their corrupt perpetrators are together referred to as Byzantines, and our overarching aim is to limit their penetration into an e-community. Our key tool in achieving this is graph conductance, and our key assumption is that honest people are averse to corrupt ones and tend to distrust them. Of particular interest is keeping the fraction of Byzantines below one third, as it would allow the use of Byzantine Agreement [13] for consensus as well as for sybilresilient social choice [16, 20] and sybil-resilient parameter update [19] . We consider sequences of expanding trust graphs and show that, under our key assumption and additional requirements from the expansion process, including keeping the conductance of the community trust graph sufficiently high, a community may expand safely.
Introduction
We wish to identify conditions under which an e-community of predominantlygenuine (truthful and unique) e-identities, may expand without increasing the penetration of sybil (fake or duplicate) e-identities. Our particular context of interest is e-democracy [17, 18] , where a sovereign e-community conducts its affairs via egalitarian decision processes, although another motivation is the task of expanding a permissioned distributed system. We consider an initial community with low sybil penetration that wishes to admit new members without admitting too many sybils. As it is not realistic to expect that no sybils will be admitted, our goal is to keep the fraction of sybils below a certain threshold. In a separate arXiv:1901.00752v2 [cs.SI] 4 Jan 2019
paper [16] , we show that an e-democracy can tolerate up to one-third sybil penetration and still function democratically. Still, the fewer the sybils, the smaller the supermajority needed to keep the decision-making safe against them.
We model an e-community via a trust graph with a vertex for each identity and with edges representing trust relations between the owners of the corresponding identities (formal definitions in Section 2). We consider genuine and sybil identities, and refer to the genuine identities that do not trust sybils as honest and those that do as corrupt. Furthermore, as we are interested in an incremental admission process that expands the initial community, we consider sequences of trust graphs that capture such incremental changes.
We are interested in identifying sufficient conditions on such graphs, e.g. the type of identities in the graph, their relative fractions, and their trust relations, under which a community may expand while keeping the fraction of sybils in it low. To achieve this, our key assumption is that honest identities tend to trust honest identities rather than corrupt ones, and our key tool is graph conductance.
Related work. We review existing work which helps in clarifying the differences to our model: A large portion of the literature on sybil attacks (see, e.g., [6, 15, 14] and their citations) is focused on sybil detection, where the task is to tell the sybil agents from the honest ones. Of particular interest is the approach initiated by Yu et al. [26] , which relies on structural properties of the underlying social network. Yu et al. show how to separate the honest and sybil regions by leveraging the relatively few number of edges between them. This framework was studied further [24, 5, 21, 22, 23, 4] .As pointed out by Alvisi et al. [2] , however, such attempts to recover the entire sybil region may potentially occur only in instances where the honest region is sufficiently connected, which is rarely the case in actual social networks. Consequently, Alvisi et al. suggest a more modest goal of producing a whitelist of honest vertices in the graph with respect to a given agent; that is, a local sybil detection scheme, in contrast to the global ones proposed before.
A problem of a similar flavor is that of corruption detection in networks, posed by Alon et al. [1] and later refined by Jin et al. [12] . This setting, inspired by auditing networks, consists of a graph with each of its vertices being either truthful or corrupt, where the overall goal is to detect the corrupt region. In contrast to the sybil detection problem, the corrupt agents are assumed to be immersed throughout the network, and the main assumption here is that each agent may accurately determine the true label of its neighbors and report it to a central authority. The authors show how good connectivity properties of the graph allows an approximate recovery of the truthful and corrupt regions.
We note that social networks have some special structure, e.g. having low diameters (a.k.a., the small world phenomena [7] ) or fragmented to highlyconnected clusters with low connectivity between different clusters. Moreover, as observed by some researchers [2, 5, 25] , the attacker's inability to maintain sufficiently many attack edges typically results in certain "bottlenecks", which can be utilized to pin-point the sybil regions.
Informal Model. While the problem we address is related to sybil detection, and indeed we incorporate some of the insights of the works discussed above, Fig. 1 . Illustration of the general setting: The white vertices (honest identities) and grey vertices (corrupt identities) form the set of genuine identities, while grey vertices (corrupt identities) and black vertices (sybil identities) form the set of Byzantines. Bold edges represent attack edges. The white vertex with a grey heart in it represents an identity that is "corrupt at heart", as currently it does not trust any sybil, but in the future it will; thus, the edge connecting it to the honest identity to its right is an attack edge as well. The circled area contains the current community that wishes to expand. Notice that the nine identities in the community contain one sybil and two corrupt identities, thus in particular the community's Byzantine penetration is β = 1 /3 and the sybil penetration is σ = 1 /9. The fraction of internal attack edges to the volume of the honest part of the community graph, defined below, is γ = 1 /8. our main goal is different: Safe community expansion. We aim to find conditions under which a community may grow without increasing the fraction of hostile members within it; but without necessarily identifying explicitly who is hostile and who is not. An additional difference from existing literature is our notions of identity and trust. Specifically, existing works consider identities or agents of only two types, "good" and "bad", with various names for the two categories. Our notion of identities is more refined and, we believe, may be closer to reality.
In particular, we consider genuine and sybil identities, with the intention that in a real-world scenario these would be characterized by the nature of their representation: genuine identities are truthful and unique, and sybil identities are fake or duplicate. We further distinguish between two types of genuine identities, based on their behavior : honest, which do not form trust relations with sybils, and corrupt, which do. This behavioral distinction is captured formally in our model. We naturally assume that the corrupt identities are the creators and operators of the sybils and that, in the worst case, all sybils and their corrupt perpetrators may cooperate, hence we label them together as Byzantines, and aim to limit their fraction within the community.
We thus begin with a unified formal model of such identities and their trust graph, consisting of vertices that represent identities and edges that represent trust relations among the owners of such identities. As we consider the task of sybil-resilient community expansion, we define the community history that aims to capture the incremental changes a community trust graph undergoes over discrete time steps. In order to properly characterize identities, we first employ the basic distinction between genuine and sybil identities. Then, using the community history, we make a further delicate distinction within genuine identities between honest identities, which never trust sybils, and corrupt identities, which may trust sybils and, furthermore, may cooperate with other corrupt or sybil community members to introduce sybils into the community.
Some assumptions on the power of the sybils and their perpetrators is needed; otherwise there is no hope in achieving our goal. Intuitively, our key assumption is that honest identities are averse to corrupt identities, and hence are not likely to trust them. We call trust edges that connect honest and corrupt identities attack edges. So, loosely speaking, we assume that there are not too many attack edges. We view this assumption as a realistic relaxation of the assumption made in some related works [1, 12] , which assume that truthful agents are able to identify precisely whether a neighbor is corrupt or not. Figure 1 illustrates our general setting.
High-level approach. Our approach for admitting a new identity to the community relies upon the conductance of the subgraph that includes the current community together with the potential candidate to be admitted. Our ability to protect the graph from Byzantine penetration is based on our key assumption that, while there could be arbitrarily many Byzantines wanting to enter the expanding community, they will have limited connectivity to the current community. Indeed, this observation was applied in the context of sybil detection [2, 26, 24, 25] . In general, while the conductance of the whole network is typically fairly low, the conductance of the subgraphs restricted to each cluster may be high. In that sense, following Alvisi et al. [2] , we adopt a local perspective and focus on the conductance of our community, regardless of the conductance of the entire network. In contrast to Alvisi et al. [2] , however, we are interested in expanding the community and not in whitelisting. Unlike the situation treated by Alvisi et al. [2] , which can be viewed as whitelisting, initiated at a singleton community (i.e. from a single non-sybil vertex), here we consider arbitrarily-large communities and aim to bound, but not detect or eliminate, the sybils in them.
Specifically, our framework makes use of a "target conductance" parameter Φ, and aims to expand, i.e., admit new members, while retaining a conductance of at least Φ at the expanded community. Assuming that the community harbors a limited number of attack edges and the relative fraction of Byzantines in the initial community is bounded, we show how to safely expand an initial community.
Preliminaries
We provide some needed definitions regarding graphs and conductance. Let G = (V, E) be an undirected graph. The degree of a vertex x ∈ V is deg(
The volume of a given subset A ⊆ V is the sum of degrees of its vertices, vol(A) := x∈A deg(x). Additionally, we denote the subgraph induced on the set of vertices A as G| A , by deg A (x) the degree of vertex x ∈ A in G| A , and by vol A (B) := x∈B deg A (x) the volume of a set B ⊆ A in G| A . Given two subsets A, B ⊆ V , the size of the cut between A and B is denoted by e(A, B) = |{(x, y) ∈ E | x ∈ A, y ∈ B}|.
Remark 1. Generally speaking, graph conductance aims to measure the connectivity of the graph by quantifying the minimal cut normalized by the volume of its smaller subset. Conductance should be thought of as the weighted and irregular analogue of edge expansion [9] , where both notions are essentially equivalent for regular graphs. To get a quantitative grip of this measure, notice that for all graphs, Φ ∈ [0, 1 2 ]. Intuitively, the conductance of a highly connected graph approaches 1 2 . E.g., cliques and complete bipartite graphs satisfy Φ = 1 2 , while in a poorly connected graph this measure may be arbitrarily small; e.g., a disconnected graph satisfies Φ = 0.
While determining the exact conductance of a given graph is known to be coNP-hard [3] , the Cheeger inequality provides a direct relation between conductance of a graph and the second eigenvalue of its random walk matrix. [10] ) Let G be a graph with conductance Φ, and let λ n ≤ ... ≤ λ 2 ≤ λ 1 denote the spectrum of its random walk matrix. Then,
Lemma 1. (Cheeger inequality
Consequently, spectral methods, together with the Cheeger inequality, provide efficient approximation algorithms for measuring conductance. We refer the reader to [9, 11] for comprehensive surveys and discussions.
Formal Model
Community Trust Graphs. The relation between people and their identities is rich and multifaceted. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that some identities are genuine and others are not, in which case they are called sybils. We represent trust relations among identities via a trust graph, in which vertices represent identities and edges represent trust among identities.
Definition 2.
A trust graph G = (V, E) is an undirected graph with vertices that represent identities and edges that represent trust among them.
As we are interested in a community (which is being expanded) in such a trust graph, next we introduce the concept of a community trust graph. Community Histories and Transitions. Our aim is to find conditions under which a community may grow safely. Hence we consider sequences of community graphs, obtained by applying elementary transitions of adding a member to the community or adding/removing an edge: Definition 4 (Elementary Community Transition). Let G = (A, V, E) and G = (A , V, E ) be two community graphs with the same set of vertices V . We say that G is obtained from G by an elementary community transition, and we denote it by G → G , if: Types of Identities. We assume identities of two types, genuine and sybil. Next, we use community histories to distinguish between two types of genuine identities -honest and corrupt: we say that an identity is honest in a community history if it never partakes in an attack edge in this history, and corrupt if it does. We then lump together sybils and corrupt identities and call them Byzantines.
Definition 5 (Community History
The rationale is that we are interested in bounding the number of sybils in the graph, not only at the present but also in the future. Hence, we need to bound also all potential sybil perpetrators, who may establish trust edges with sybils in the future, in an attempt to introduce them into the community. Hence, at any point in time (community graph in a community history) , a corrupt identity may be only "corrupt at heart", with no action as-of-yet to demonstrate its corruption; and our key assumption is that honest identities are averse to corrupt identities even if they are only corrupt at heart. Below and in the rest of the paper we use disjoint union A = B C as a shorthand for A = B ∪ C, B ∩ C = ∅.
Definition 6 (Types of identities, Attack edges, Sybil penetration).
Let V be a set of vertices that consist of two disjoint subsets V = T S of genuine T and sybil S vertices, and let G V be a community history over V . Then, a genuine vertex t ∈ T is corrupt in G V if it trusts a sybil at anytime in G V , namely, there is some (t, s) ∈ E, with t ∈ T , s ∈ S, for some G = (A, V, E) ∈ G V . A genuine vertex that is not corrupt is said to be honest. Thus, G V partitions the genuine identities T = H C into honest H and corrupt C identities. An edge (h, c) ∈ E is an attack edge if h ∈ H and c ∈ C. The sybil penetration σ(G) of a community trust graph
Remark 2. An important observation is that an attack edge (h, c) may be introduced into a community trust graph in a community history, and be defined as such, even if the corruption of c is still latent in this community trust graph, namely before a trust edge (c, s) between c and a sybil s is introduced.
Bounded attacks and resilience. Our key assumption is that honest people tend to trust honest people and distrust corrupt people; we capture the degree in which this is the case by the following parameter γ:
Definition 7 (γ-bounded attack). Let G V be a community history over V = T S that partitions T = H C into honest H and corrupt C identities. A community trust graph G = (A, V, E) ∈ G V has a γ-bounded attack if
That is, γ is an upper bound on the fraction of attack edges within A to the volume of the honest subset of A. In the worst case, sybils and their corrupt perpetrators would cooperate; thus, to allow for iterative community expansion we must bound their combined presence in the community, as defined next:
Definition 8 (Byzantines and their Penetration). Let G V be a community history over V = T S that partitions T = H C into honest H and corrupt C identities. Then, a vertex v ∈ V is Byzantine if it is a sybil or corrupt and the Byzantines B = S ∪ C are the union of the sybil and corrupt vertices. The Byzantine penetration β(G) of a community trust graph
As A = (A ∩ H) (A ∩ B), it would occasionally be convenient to use the equivalence between Byzantine penetration to the community A and the fraction of Byzantines w.r.t. genuine identities in A. Formally,
As mentioned above, it is necessary to have some assumptions on the quality of our trust graphs.The next definition, of α-solidarity, measures a certain aspect of the connectivity within the community; roughly speaking, it requires that each vertex in the community would have many neighbors inside the community:
Definition 9 (α-solidarity). Given a community trust graph G = (A, V, E), a vertex a ∈ A satisfies α-solidarity if:
where d is the maximal degree of G. The graph G satisfies α-solidarity if every a ∈ A satisfies α-solidarity.
The following definition combines some of the definitions above. Note that in this definition β is a free parameter.
Definition 10 (Community graph resilience). Let G ∈ G V be a community trust graph in a community history G V over V , α ∈ [0, 1], and β, γ ∈ [0, 1 2 ]. We say that G is (α, β, γ)-resilient if the following hold: 1) G satisfies α-solidarity;
2) G has a γ-bounded attack; and 3)
Remark 3. To internalize the above definition, consider the options available for a community that wishes to achieve some resilience to a given Byzantine penetration β: (i) to increase solidarity, α, up to 1; (ii) to increase conductance, Φ, up to 1 /2; (iii) or to curb the attack, γ, down to 0. However: (i) increasing solidarity may prevent the community from admitting additional members, defeating the purpose of community growth; (ii) increasing conductance may require community members who do not know each other to trust each other, defeating the notion of trust; and (iii) curbing the attack will require the community to expose sybils and their corrupt perpetrators, which is a challenge. In summary, achieving (α, β, γ)-resilience for a given β is a challenge, and addressing it will require a community to craft a balance between its desire to grow, the measures it is willing to undertake to support such growth, and the risks it is willing to undertake in order to grow.
Lemma 2. Let G ∈ G V be a community trust graph in a community history
Proof. From the conductance of G we have that
where the second inequality applies the definition of conductance and the fact that vol A (B ∩ A) ≤ vol A (H ∩ A), due to Byzantine penetration not greater than 1 2 ; and the third stems from the requirement that each vertex is of degree at least αd, and the fact that only corrupt identities obtain attack edges, and each of them is of degree at most d. The last inequality applies the partition B = C S.
Safe Community Expansion
The following main theorem provides a sufficient condition for safe community expansion: It guarantees low Byzantine penetration in a community trust graph G if it has certain properties and is obtained via an elementary transition from a community trust graph G that has low Byzantine penetration.
Remark 4. This theorem can be understood in at least two ways: (i) as offering formal guidelines to a community wishing to expand without increasing its sybil penetration; and (ii) as suggesting an algorithm that incrementally admits new identities to the community whenever the conditions of Definition 10 hold, thus guaranteeing low Byzantine penetration rate in the evolving community. 
Before proving the above main theorem we present a corollary that considers community expansion over time. Proof. Towards contradiction, let G k be the first community graph for which β(G k ) > β. An elementary operation G → G involving either edge addition or edge removal does not alter the proportion of Byzantines within the community, so G k must be obtained via vertex addition from G k−1 . As a proper community history G V = G 1 , G 2 , ... satisfies A 1 ⊆ A 2 ⊆ ..., we have β ≤ 2 , where the second inequality follows from the Byzantine penetration in G. It follows therefore that |A ∩B| < |A ∩H|. Also, from α-solidarity we get that vol A (A ∩B) ≥ αd|A ∩B| and vol A (A ∩ H) ≥ αd|A ∩ H| > αd|A ∩ B|. Using the conductance of G it follows specifically that:
Since G has a γ-bounded attack, we can write:
Combining the last two equations together we get:
where the first equality holds as A = (A ∩ H) (A ∩ B), the second inequality stems from Equation 3 and the third inequality stems from Equation 2. Flipping the nominator and the denominator then gives β(A ) := |A ∩B| |A | < β.
Discussion
We discuss implications of the theorem above to sparse graphs, relations between the parameters α, β, and γ, and methods to estimate their values. Sparse Graphs. Recall that the safety of the community expansion relies upon the parameters α, β, and γ. While a given community may evolve wrt. any choice of parameters, some choices will inevitably yield degenerate outcomes; one case is as we require Φ(G| A ) > , the fact that their degree is of order d = Θ(n) makes them unrealistic in our setting, where agents may potentially trust only a uniformlybounded number of identities. In this context, the main question seems to be the following: Could a given community safely expand while retaining a given maximal degree d? Surprisingly, not only that the answer is affirmative, it also holds for a plethora of trust graphs. We utilize Friedman's classical result: Theorem 2. (Friedman [8] , rephrased) Let G be a random d-regular graph on n vertices. Then, for any 0 < , λ(G) ≤
+ holds with probability 1 − o n (1).
Thus, almost all d-regular graphs on n vertices satisfy λ 2 ≤ 2 √ d
. Applying this term in Cheeger's inequality (see Lemma 1) yields that such graphs satisfy
meaning that the choice of d affects the level of conductance one hopes to achieve. Parameter Interplay. We consider numerical examples to better appreciate the analysis above. First, consider the realistic assumption where each identity is assumed to trust up to d = 100 identities (notice that this can be enforced by the system). Equation 4 now suggests that a random graph of degree d on n vertices (where d may be constant wrt. n) satisfies Φ > 2 5 . For simplicity, we take this quantity as a benchmark. It follows that whenever
, there exist a plethora of potential community histories for which a given community may potentially expand to be arbitrarily large. Some further examples: (1) if γ = 0, then any community history that begins with a connected Byzantinefree community would retain 0-Byzantine penetration; (2) the choice β = 0 is not attainable, corresponding to the intuition that we can never guarantee a completely Byzantine-free community expansion. Figure 2 illustrates the parameter interplay further. Notice that our key assumption, stating that honest people tend to trust honest people more than they tend to trust corrupt people, implies that γ < β (as γ > β implies that honest people trust corrupt people more than their relative share in the community). 4 Parameter Estimation. While α and Φ can be decided by the community, β(G) and γ rely on the dynamics of the community history. To incrementally expand the community at a given time, one may settle for estimating the current state of affairs, as follows. Specifically, assuming that a thorough examination of a given identity could determine whether it is genuine or sybil, one may apply random checks to empirically estimate β(G) and γ. This could be carried out in the following manner: (1) examination of an identity x ∈ V determines whether it is genuine or sybil; (2) examination of the neighbors of a genuine identity x ∈ V (the ball of radius 1 around it) determines whether it is explicitly (but not latently) corrupt; and (3) examination of the ball of radius 2 around an honest identity x determines whether its neighbors are explicitly Byzantine.
Outlook
We proposed a method which allows an e-community to expand in a sybil-safe way. Future research includes mechanisms to penalizing the creation of attack edges, modeling the possibility of honest identities abandoning the community, and using simulations to better understand the dynamics of safe expansion.
